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June 2015 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policy in the CEMAC zone and 
identify the link between this cyclicality effects and the multilateral supervision rules. Based 
on a non-dynamic panel data model inspired by Gali and Perotti (2003), and Cimadomo (2005), 
the results show that the fiscal policies applied in CEMAC zone are highly pro-cyclical. This 
pro-cyclicality is accentuated since the practice of multilateral supervision rules.Counter-
cyclical fiscal policies appear as an alternative for the countries of this community to smooth 
out fluctuations in their business cycles and simultaneously reduce the probability of 
asymmetric shocks that seem harmful to the monetary policy.A review of the convergence 
criteria is therefore necessary since those used in CEMAC zone do not take into account the 
intrinsic characteristics of countries in the region. 
JEL code: E3, E6, H3. 
Key words: fiscal policy, Pro cyclicality, monetary union, multilateral supervision. 
 
Résumé 
L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser la cyclicité de la politique budgétaire en zone CEMAC 
et son lien avec les critères de surveillance multilatérale. A travers un modèle de panel 
dynamique, inspiré de Gali et Perotti (2003), et Cimadomo (2005), il ressort de notre étude que, 
les politiques budgétaires des pays de la CEMAC sont fortement pro cycliques. Cette pro 
cyclicité est accentuée par l’application des critères de surveillance multilatérale, ce qui 
renforce la volatilité des cycles. Les politiques budgétaires contra cycliques apparaissent 
comme une alternative pour les pays de la sous-région afin de pouvoir lisser les fluctuations de 
leurs cycles économiques et entrainer par la même occasion une diminution de la probabilité 
d’occurrence des chocs dissymétriques nuisibles à la politique monétaire. Une révision des 
critères de convergence s’impose donc en CEMAC car celles retenues ne tiennent pas compte 
des caractéristiques intrinsèques des pays de la zone.  
Classification JEL: E3, E6, H3. 
Mots-clés: Politique budgétaire, Pro cyclicité, Union monétaire, Surveillance multilatérale. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
The present study builds upon the fact that fiscal policy in developing countries tend to be pro-
cyclical. In other words, these countries in general lead expansionary fiscal policy (increase of 
public spending/reduction of taxes) in time of good conjuncture and restrictive policies 
(reduction of public spending/increase of taxes) during recessions. According to the economic 
theory, these behaviours strengthen the volatility of business cycle and damage the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyse the conduct of the fiscal policy of the countries 
of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) zone, according to the 
evolution of the business cycle, and to identify the effects of the implementation of the criteria 
of multilateral supervision on the behaviour of the latter. 
This study leads to the following results: 
1. Fiscal policies in CEMAC are pro-cyclical, mainly in expansion periods. This behaviour 
is explained in the economic theory by the fact that during the upturn time and because 
of the instability of the tax base, governments are regularly under political pressures 
coming from labour unions, associations, political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, local communities, what urges States to increase public spending during 
good economic phase. 
2. In phase of recession, contrary to previous studies made on the CEMAC zone, we find 
that the fiscal policy of States are acyclic. In other words, States leave their level of 
spending unchanged when market conditions are unfavourable. This finding might be 
explained by the fact that, during recessions, owing to the price drop of raw materials and 
specifically oil, governments can be forced to keep unchanged some expenditure 
(sometime irreversible) in order to avoid potential reprisals from pressure groups which 
think of not benefiting enough from oil resources. Thus, to address the fall in government 
revenues, the States can finance their spending by the accumulation of arrears or while 
contracting debt with the central bank, knowing that the monetary financing of public 
deficits is not yet completely removed. 
3. Since the implementation of the multilateral supervision, the pro-cyclical nature of fiscal 
policy has increased. It is worth noting that this finding may also be related to the good 
behaviour of commodity prices and to the increase of oil production and exploitation in 
the CEMAC zone. 
Based on the above findings, we provide a number of policy recommendations: 
1. States should conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies in order to smooth out the business 
cycle and enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
2. Fiscal rules should be amended in order to take into account the intrinsic characteristics 
of the economies of the sub-region. For instance, one could move toward a fiscal rule 
based on a structural balance or an optimal deficit rule. As for the debt, one may try to 
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make it sustainable by identifying an optimal debt threshold or to migrate toward a 
dynamic debt rule whose the threshold may change according to the trajectory of the 
economy, while remaining within a reasonable proportion. 
3. States should operate a double diversification of the productive structures and tax 
revenues in order to reduce the dependence on oil. The latter recommendation is based 
on the fact that non-oil tax revenues are low in CEMAC while in some emergent and 
developed countries, these incomes which are less volatile are more important and 
sometime superior to 50% of the total revenues. The idea is not to recommend an increase 
of the fiscal pressure, but rather an improvement of methods used for tax collection 
(reforms, use of secured and traceable methods, and decrease of the size of the informal 
sector….etc) and mainly to proceed to the extension of the tax base. 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged today that fiscal policies in developing countries tend to be pro-
cyclical. In other words, these governments tend to increase their public expenditures during 
expansion phases and reduce them during recession. On the other hand, it is also recognized 
that the fiscal policies of the industrialized (developed) countries appear sometimes 
countercyclical or acyclical2, then giving rise to budget deficits (Gavin et al., 1996; Gavin and 
Perotti 1997a; Talvi and Vegh 2005, Alesina and Tabellini 2005, Perotti, 2007). 
According to Frankel, Végh and Vuletin (2011), some countries may have a "degree" in the 
application of pro-cyclical policies. Even if these policies increase the volatility of cycles, they 
remain a predominant reality in the developing world. 
Since Keynes (1936) we recognize in fiscal policy an ability to play a stabilizing role in the 
economic activity. Indeed, the standard Keynesian model teaches us that fiscal policy should 
be countercyclical, that is, expansionary during recession phases and restrictive during 
expansion ones. Being restrictive during booms, fiscal policies allow the economy to preserve 
itself against crisis, this measure is also relevant today following the various crises in the world. 
Frankel (2010)3 also explains that one of the most success policy carried out by the Chilean 
government was to apply counter-cyclical policies during the surge in copper prices allowing it 
to cope with the crisis of 2008/2009 and the 2010 economic earthquake. This example is 
according to Frankel ideal for all countries producing raw materials in order to avoid the Dutch 
Disease. 
Concerning the Central African Economic and Monetary Countries 4  (CEMAC), this 
community has since 1994 adopted a set of rules5 not only to avoid fiscal skids, but also to 
ensure macroeconomic stability in the whole sub-region. Among the rules that interests us, one 
of them outlawed budget deficits within the Member States and is followed by the one that 
limits states debt rate at 70% of their GDP.  
Thus, in regards to the difficulties faced by most countries to respect the rules and maintain an 
effective framework of macroeconomic stability, it is reasonable to question the relevance of 
the multilateral supervision criteria in CEMAC zone. Indeed, if countries are forced to make a 
null or a positive budget balance, this also implies that they will have to make spending cuts to 
avoid deficits during recession6. Also, during expansion7 (and when the debt is at a desired 
level), these countries tend to increase their spending for example due to pressure from voters 
                                                             
2Public expenditures remain unchanged whatever the evolution of business cycle. 
3
 "how to make less pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies in countries producing raw materials?”, during a 
conference in Alger. 
4
 CEMAC zone is made up of six countries including Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central 
African Republic, and Chad. 
5
 Commonly called multilateral supervision criteria. 
6
 During which revenue declines. 
7
 During which revenue increases. 
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and groups such as political parties, non-governmental organizations, which typically require 
more public goods and services in expansion phases (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005) 
It is therefore important to ask whether or not the criteria in the context of multilateral 
surveillance accentuate the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy in CEMAC zone? 
To answer this question, we present in a first section the context and the effects of multilateral 
supervision in CEMAC zone; the second section deals with the literature on how fiscal policy 
is conducted over the cycle; the third section in turn exposes the model results and the economic 
policy recommendations. 
 
1. Context and effects of multilateral supervision in CEMAC zone8 
Multilateral supervision was established in 1994 following the signature of the Treaty 
establishing CEMAC community. This implementation has been carried out in a crisis situation 
where almost all countries in the region were under Structural Adjustment Program with the 
Bretton Woods institutions. It was sort of a framework of macroeconomic stability to prevent 
fiscal skid and to maintain a certain fiscal discipline in order to achieve a convergence of 
economic policies and their consistency with the common monetary policy (Avom and 
Gbetnkom, 2003). 
Since January 2002, the main criteria (first row) provide that: (i) the ratio of basic fiscal balance 
to GDP must be positive or null, (ii) the debt ratio must not exceed 70% of GDP, (iii) countries 
should not accumulate arrears of interest to both internal and external debt, (iv) and finally the 
maximum inflation rate is 3%. 
Under those rules, the fiscal balance was to be achieved by 2004, which has also been facilitated 
by the discovery and exploitation of oil in some countries (Equatorial Guinea in 1998 and Chad 
in 2003), but at the cost of volatility cycles and only the Central African Republic (non-oil) 
could have surpluses during this period as shown in the table below. 
Table 1: Evolution of the basic fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP in CEMAC 
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Cameroon 4,1 2,4 3,7 3,9 2,8 4,9 5,6 5,2 4,5 3,3 0,1 -0,4 
CAR -0,8 -1,0 -0,5 -3,4 -4,0 -4,6 -1,1 -0,7 -1,7 -0,3 -0,9 -2,0 
Congo 1,5 -0,7 -7,2 1,0 4,9 17,4 17,8 10,2 27,3 5,0 25,5 19,8 
Gabon 12,3 4,2 2,6 7,4 7,9 9,6 10,2 9,5 12,5 8,5 3,3 4,6 
EG 8,5 15,9 12,9 13,4 11,4 20,9 25,7 20,7 17,6 -4,2 -5,5 1,0 
Chad -2,9 -2,2 -3,2 -1,7 2,1 1,1 3,8 3,6 4,5 -8,4 -1,6 2,5 
          
 
  
Number of 
states* 
3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 
 
Oil GDP 4,54 4,20 4,36 4,67 6,07 10,00 11,66 12,06 15,87 10,82 14,79 18,37 
*Which respected the rule. 
Source: Author with BEAC data. 
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It thus appears that, the rule of the basic fiscal balance is respected by the oil-producing 
countries and mainly when the incomes resulting from the oil exploitation are significant. So, 
it is normal to think that, the respect of this criterion does not have a link with the fiscal policy, 
but more with the behavior of the raw materials.  It would be thus interesting that the States of 
CEMAC follow true prospective budget policies in order to cover risks related to the volatility 
of the raw materials prices on the international markets.  In addition, if a State is forced to have 
a positive or null net budgetary position, this State will necessary use procyclical budget 
policies in order to limit the expenditure in recession to avoid an excessive accumulation of 
deficits. 
Indeed, we see that the convergence criteria established in the framework of multilateral 
supervision appear as copies of Maastricht European standards but without deficits (Avom, 
2002). In fact: 
• The criterion based on the fiscal balance does not encourage the implementation of counter-
cyclical policies to stabilize economic activity and induce further synchronization of cycles; 
• The debt criterion limits the flexibility of governments to finance expenditures, but encourages 
the pressures on taxation and discourages private investment; 
• The inflation criterion is closer to that of developed countries but may represent a target short 
term due to the anchorage of the CFA franc to the euro. However, studies show that developing 
countries would need inflation rates well above 3% (Ghosh and Phillips, 2003; Druker et al, 
2005; Bikai and Kamgna, 2012). 
Given these effects, it is tempting to think a substantial revision of the main convergence criteria 
in the CEMAC zone. 
In fact, non-compliance with these criteria in different CEMAC countries highlights the 
problem of heterogeneity in the sub-region, mainly heterogeneities cycles that also interfere 
with the conduct of monetary policy. Indeed, if in the sub-region one country is in an expansion 
phase while another is in a recession, to stabilize the cycles of the two countries the monetary 
authorities should conduct a restrictive policy for the first country and an expansive policy for 
the second. However, monetary policy is common; it will be either restrictive or expansive but 
not both. As a result, one of the countries will be charged a monetary policy that accentuates 
cyclical fluctuations. Thus, monetary policy has asymmetric effects on different countries. Use 
national fiscal policies for economic stabilization using counter-cyclical fiscal policies in 
CEMAC can prove to be a mitigating factor for asymmetric shocks. It can also improves the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and the convergence because Cameroon and Gabon are the 
main States which sometimes respect the majority of convergence criteria like we see in table 
2. 
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Table2 : Multilateral supervision criteria in CEMAC 
 
Source : Author with BEAC data. 
 Cameroon 
Criteria 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) + - + + + + - + - + - + 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) - + + + - + + + + - - + 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) - + + + + + + + + + + + 
 Central Africa Republic 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) - - + - + + - + - - + + 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) - - - - - - - - + - - - 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) - - - - - - - - + + + + 
 Republic of Congo 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) + + + + - + - + - - + + 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) + - - + + + + + + + + + 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) - - - - - - - - + - - - 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) - - - - - - - - + + + + 
 Gabon 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) + + + + + + - - - + + + 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) + - - - - + + + + + + - 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) - - - + + + + + + + + + 
 Equatorial Guinea 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) + + + + + + + + + - - + 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) - + - + + + + + + + + + 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
 Chad 
Mean annual inflation rate (≤ 3%) - - - + + - - + - - + + 
The ratio of basic fiscal balance to GDP 
(≥0) - - - - + + + + + - - + 
Arrears of interest to both internal and 
external debt (< 0) - - - - - - - - + - - - 
The debt ratio  (< 70%) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
 
Number of State respected all the 
criteria 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 
- = don’t respect criteria ; + = respect criteria 
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However, before checking the relevance of these analyzes, in an econometric model, it is wise 
to recall the theoretical developments on how the fiscal policy is conducted over the cycle. 
 
2. Contribution of the literature on the link between the management of the fiscal 
policy and the business cycle. 
Initially, the Keynesian analysis (1936), showing how changes in public spending can affect 
the behaviour of economic agents and also show that an effective way to regulate economic 
activity was to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The government then should estimate 
the likely level of demand for the next two years and if it is too low, the government has to 
increase its expenditure, decrease taxes or interest rates. In contrary, if it seemed too high, the 
context will be exactly the opposite. This approach has been effective in several countries as 
far as the crisis years 70-80. 
According to the neoclassical view, the use of fiscal policy to stabilization created distortions 
on economic activity. That is why, inspired by David Ricardo, Barro (1974) has contributed to 
reject Keynesian analysis of fiscal policy by the principle of Ricardian equivalence. For this 
author, private agents include in their calculation the inter-temporal budget constraint of the 
state and anticipate its behaviour. However, Barro (1979) stated the fiscal policies should be 
neutral or acyclical, nowadays we still speak of "smoothing fiscal policy." The establishment 
of a neutral fiscal policy aims to avoid inter-temporal distortions by leaving unchanged primary 
spending and tax rates whatever the evolution of the cycle, and in this case, only the automatic 
stabilizers play a role in the economy.  
However, some studies show that the industrialised countries have generally countercyclical or 
acyclical fiscal policies. Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994), Fiorito (1997) show that the correlation 
between public consumption and the product is not always established and tends to be null in 
the G7 countries. However, the relationship between tax rates and activity is difficult to 
highlight as shown in Barro (1990), Huang and Lin (1993), and Strazicich (1997), these authors 
conclude with the case of USA that, tax rates are generally fixed for smoothing forecasts 
government spending. Cooley and Hansen (1995) on the other hand believe that, although 
difficult to determine tax rates generally tend to rise during booms and fall during recessions. 
Thus, it is generally accepted that pro-cyclical fiscal policies are used in developing countries. 
Gavin et al. (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997a) show why the fiscal policies of Latin American 
countries are generally pro-cyclical. Indeed, these authors show that during booms, public 
consumption increase and taxes decrease, while the opposite effect is observed during 
expansion. This result highlights a negative correlation between the product cycle and the 
taxation rate. International credit rationing is the cause of this pro-cyclical behaviour according 
to Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997a, 1997b); Catão and 
Sutton (2001) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). For these authors, in bad times 
(recession), either the developing countries cannot find funding, or they can borrow at very high 
ratesand that may increase their deficits. So they are forced to decrease their expenditures. 
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During the good times in contrary, they can easily borrow at a low rate that encourages the 
increase of public spending. 
However, Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) to take the opposite view of this 
explanation, they suggest that if governments anticipate credit rationing during recession 
periods, so they could save in good times in order to smooth spending over time. Alesina and 
Tabellini (2005) add that some malicious governments usually want to capture the country's 
resources, and in this context, voters often require more public goods and lower taxes to prevent 
bad behaviour during periods of economic boom. The requirement of voters leads the 
governments to increase public spending during the good times that makes the pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy. 
Talvi and Vegh (2005) show in also that developing countries have a pro-cyclical fiscal 
behaviour, and explain this by the fact that these governments are often subject to political 
pressures because of significant instability of the tax base. According to them, public 
expenditure would therefore be influenced by pressure groups (unions, associations, political 
parties, non-governmental organizations, local authorities ...) and generally accentuate these 
pressures during the expansion phases. Political pressures discussed by these authors tend to 
force countries to decrease their primary spending during recession and increase them during 
expansion.  
Recently, Frankel, and Vuletin Vegh (2011), still felt that some emerging countries may have 
a "degree" in the application of pro-cyclical policies, so that they reinforce (much more than 
they stabilize) the volatility cycles but still remain a mainstream phenomenon in the developing 
world. Végh and Vuletin (2012) confirmed with a sample of 62 countries9 that tax policies are 
strongly pro-cyclical in developing countries and countercyclical or acyclical in industrialised 
countries. 
With these teachings, it appears necessary to go into in detailof the analysis through an 
econometric model to determine whether or not the fiscal policy is really pro-cyclical in 
CEMAC zone. It is also necessary to see if the multilateral supervisionaccentuates the pro-
cyclical bias in order to conclude for a possible revision of the convergence criteria. 
 
3. Empirical assessment of the pro-cyclicality of the fiscal policy in the CEMAC 
zone. 
3.1. Econometric model 
Among the different specifications used to analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policy, the most 
frequent used is the following one (see Wyplosz, 2002; Gali and Perotti, 2003; Cimadomo, 
2005; Guillaumont Tapsoba, 2011): 
 =   + 

 + 
 +  +      (1) 
                                                             
9
 20 industrialized countries and 42 developing countries. 
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Talvi et Vegh (2005), Alesina et Tabellini (2005), Vegh et Vuletin (2012) are made a 
theorical demonstration of this relation. 
In this representation: 
• is a fiscal policy variable of country i at time t that can be either the structural 
balance, i.e. public spending or revenue reported to GDP. Because of the preponderance of 
external debt within developing countries, Talvi and Vegh (2005) suggest to use primary 
expenditures which exclude the debt service that has no impact on aggregate demand. However, 
Cimadomo (2005) uses the structural primary balance. We use the structural balance and 
expenditure in our analysis. 
• 
  represents the level of the previous fiscal variable retained. It measures the 
degree of inertia of fiscal policy due to some delaying issues. Indeed, if 
 is positive and close 
to 1 (too high), then the behavior of the fiscal authorities do not change much over time and the 
opposite phenomenon is observed if 
 is small. 
• 
is our variable of interest and represents the output gap of country i in period t-
1.This difference is sometimes called “output GAP", that is the difference between the observed 
GDP and potential GDP. This variable measures the evolution of the cycle during time. 
Therefore negative values of this variable correspond to recession periods, while positive values 
correspond to expansion periods. Thus the coefficient  allows us to analyze the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy. Then a positive value of  corresponds to a counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
aggregate, while a negative coefficient implies a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. In other words, if 
is not significant the fiscal policy will be acyclic. 
However, to test the hypothesis of asymmetric fiscal policy according to the cycle phases, we 
introduce a dummy variable to split 
in two along the cycle phase. We then had two new 
variables: 
• 

 = 
 ∗ ( > 0) , where ( < 0) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 when the output gap is positive.
 represents the expansive phase of the cycle; 
• 

 = 
 ∗ ( < 0),  where ( < 0) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 when the output gap is negative. 
  represents the recession phase of the cycle. 
Therefore the new representation could be presented as follows: 
 =   + 

 + 

 + 

 +  +      (2) 
Under this new representation, the cyclicality of fiscal policy is measured by  and 
corresponding to the expansion and recession periods respectively. Since in our baseline 
estimates we use the structural balance as a fiscal policy variable, a significant and negative 
value of   implies a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the expansion phase, and a similar 
interpretationcould be madeup for  in recession phase. 
•  represents a set of control variables expected to have a link with the fiscal variables. 
For example: the debt ratio of the previous period (Wyplosz, 2002; Gali and Perotti, 2003; 
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Cimadomo, 2005, Williams and Adedeji , 2007), fluctuations in the terms of trade10 (Garvin 
and Perotti, 1997; Doré and Mason, 2002; Williams and Adedeji, 2007) ; public aid11  in 
percentage of GDP (Guillaumont and Tapsoba, 2011). However in some estimates, we control 
for the 1994 devaluation that had a significant impact on some macroeconomic balances. 
• is the error term. 
Indeed, to take account of multilateral supervision that took effect after 1994, we also introduce 
a dummy variable (SM95) among the key variables in order to deal with the effect of 
multilateral supervision on the cyclicality of the fiscal policy. This dummy variable takes the 
values 1 from 1995 and 0 before. Therefore we have the following representation: 
 =   + 

 + 

 + 

 + 

 ∗  !(95) + $

 ∗  !(95)
+ % +                (3) 
From this new representation, we can compare the periods before and after the multilateral 
supervision to check whether or not the multilateral supervision has increased the occurrence 
of pro-cyclical policies in CEMAC. 
 
3.2. Data and estimation methods 
The estimates are based on a balanced panel model made by the six CEMAC countries over the 
period from 1987 to 2010. Almost all variables come from the World Bank WDI (World 
Development Indicator, 2011) database. However the structural balance used here comes from 
an estimate. Indeed, changes in the structural balance in general give us the direction and 
intensity of the pulses discretionary adopted by governments. And, statistically, the structural 
balance is determined by the difference between the actual balance and cyclical component: 
 '()(*+ =   ,-'./ −  ),12,1)(*+           (4) 
Two remarks can be made as well: on the one hand, the structural balance, to the extent that it 
is not dependent on economic fluctuations, is often used as an indicator of the fiscal adjustment 
necessary because it is more important than the cyclical balance and better reflects the evolution 
of the actual balance as can be seen in the graph below. On the other hand, changes in the 
structural balance gives us the direction and intensity of the pulses discretionary adopted by the 
government. 
And the structural budget balance is the residual of the estimation of equation (5) below: 
 4 = 56 +  7                                (5) 
                                                             
10
 The terms of trade are the main source of exogenous shocks on income and expenditure and are represented here 
by the difference between the levels of terms of trade with their observed trend. This specification assumes that 
only unanticipated changes in terms of trade relative to its trend affect fiscal policy (Guillaumont and Tapsoba, 
2011). 
 
11
 The control quality for aid is explained by the fact that the basic balance which is one of the quantitative criteria 
for multilateral supervision in CEMAC is calculated without including expenditures in capital financed from the 
outside, thus aid is supposed to have a negative effect on the budget balance since government revenues are 
calculated excluding grants (Guillaumont and Tapsoba, 2009). 
14 
 
 
In this specification,  4is the actual balance;56is the cyclical balance that represents a 
proportion α of the GAP output, and this residual estimate will represent the structural balance 
(7̂). To determine the potential GDP so as to calculate the GAP output, we use the Hodrick-
Prescott and they recommended values of 1600 for the smoothing parameter with respect to 
quarterly data and 100 for annual data. Bouthevillain (2002) suggests 30 per annual series while 
Baxter and King (1999) adopt values between 100 and 400. In our case, potential GDP is 
calculated using three values of the current HP filter: 30 (Bouthevillain, 2002), 100 (Backus 
and Kehoe, 1992), 400 (Correia et al 1992). However, we have chosen the final parameter 30 
because it gives us more significant results as noticed in the graph below that the structural 
balance estimated and used follows the remarkable evolution of the actual balance. 
Table 3: Estimated balance (which represents the residual estimates). 
Estimations Smoothing 
parameter 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficient p-value Residual 
estimates 
First 
estimation 
 
30 
 
SOB 
 
GAP (30) 
 
-0,0536487 
 
0,001 
 
SBS30 
Second 
estimation 
 
100 
 
SOB 
 
GAP (100) 
 
0,007773 
 
0,087 
 
SBS100 
Third 
estimation 
 
400 
 
SOB 
 
GAP (400) 
 
0,0215592 
 
0,146 
 
SBS400 
Note: SOB = actual balance, GAP = Output gap, SBS = Structural budget balance 
Figure 1: Evolution of balances in CEMAC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors based on data from WDI 2011. 
However, due to the simultaneity bias between fiscal policy and economic activity (measured 
by the output gap), the estimation of equation (3) which allows we to analyze the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy can’t be done by ordinary least squares. Estimation by GMM is appropriate, but 
the small number of countries expose us to the Roodman critical (2009) that the number of 
individuals (i = 1 ... n) must be greater than the period of the study (t = 1 ... T). Gali and Perotti 
(2003), Alesina et al. (2007) use the method of instrumental variables to solve the simultaneity 
bias by using instruments such as the cycle period and delayed cycle ofthe most important 
trading partner. However, the fixed effects estimator (within estimator) can also be used. 
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3.3. Results 
Our results confirm the pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the CEMAC zone. In fact, as it can be seen 
in Table 3 below, the structural balance reacts negatively to the changing economic situation. 
The negative effect is more pronounced and significant when using the method of instrumental 
variables that appear most appropriate here. In the period of expansion the structural fiscal 
balance decrease during the next period, and therefore increase public spending. 
However, we can also observe that the delayed balance plays a very significant change in the 
structural balance in CEMAC zone and the size of its coefficient (0.8 or 0.6) reflects the inertia 
of fiscal policy. The inertia can be explained by the long policy delays on the one hand, or high 
expenditures which are made in several years. However, aid plays a significant and positive 
impact on the structural balance that is in accordance with our expectations. 
Similarly, the devaluation has enabled CEMAC countries to revive economic growth and 
restore macroeconomic balances after the crisis of 1990s. It has also a positive impact on the 
structural balance. Only the delayed debt has not a significant impact at least at a 10% threshold. 
However, the coefficient associated with this variable has the expected sign, because too much 
debt accumulation compromises the health of public finances. 
Table 3: Cyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in CEMAC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables     
Dependent variable : Structural budget balance (HP 30) 
Aid 0.0401 0.285*** 0.0555 0.120** 
 (0.0738) (0.0749) (0.0562) (0.0541) 
 
Delayed debt -0.00564 -0.0761*** -0.00214 -0.0131 
 (0.0167) (0.0183) (0.00911) (0.00903) 
 
Terms of trade 14.44*** 17.72*** 15.20*** 17.47*** 
 (4.271) (3.736) (4.196) (3.960) 
 
Delayed balance 0.815*** 0.434*** 0.792*** 0.600*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0916) (0.0759) (0.0861) 
 
Output gap -2.410* -0.638 -3.155** -3.383*** 
 (1.250) (1.119) (1.338) (1.252) 
 
Devaluation  9.043***  5.319*** 
  (1.444)  (1.300) 
 
Constante 1.327 -0.550 1.235 -1.923 
 (1.397) (1.247) (1.010) (1.200) 
 
R² 0,55 0,66 0,56 0,62 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
*** P <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1 
(1) Estimated with fixed effects 
(2) Estimation with fixed effects and control for devaluation 
 (3) Estimated by Instrumental Variables (delayed cycle, cycle of China)  
(4) Estimated by Instrumental Variables (adding the EU cycle) and control for inflation 
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Fiscal policy and the cycle phases 
It appears that during booms, the pro-cyclical bias of the fiscal policy is observed in CEMAC 
zone. Indeed, we observed most often in developing countries a significant increase in public 
spending during booms as shown many authors. This procyclicality can be explained by the 
instability of the tax base governments which are most of time subjected to political pressures 
by unions, associations, political groups, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, and 
these pressures increase generally in expansion phase, that is why government spending 
increase and degrades the structural balance.  
However we observe during recession phases an acyclical fiscal policy unlike Guillaumont 
Tapsoba (2011).This behaviour is justified in CEMAC zone by the fact that oil is a real leverage 
for growth. So, during recessions usually due to decline in commodity prices and especially of 
oil, governments are sometimes forced to leave unchanged certain expenditures and revenues 
due to potential reaction of pressure groups. However, the inertia of fiscal policy remains 
pronounced. 
Pro-cyclicality and multilateral supervision 
Regarding multilateral supervision, we find that the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy is 
reinforced from the period of adoption of the multilateral supervision criteria. Thus, during the 
expansion phases over the period of analysis, the coefficient of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy is -2.690, and it is estimated at -10.85 after the adoption of multilateral supervision. This 
result confirms our previous analysis whereby multilateral supervision has helped to strengthen 
the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy in CEMAC.  
However, when the terms of trade are improved, a positive and significant effect is felt on the 
structural balance and may result in increased revenue. According to our previous results, the 
phenomenon of inertia of fiscal policy remains robust and significant. 
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Tableau 4: Cyclicality of the fiscal policyand multilateral supervision in CEMAC 
Variables (1)  (2) Dependent variable : Structural balance 
    
EP>0 (Expansion) -2.690*   
 (1.415) 
 
  
EP<0 (Recession) -23.37   
 (16.85) 
 
  
Aid 0.118**  0.0348 
 (0.0558)  (0.130) 
 
Delayed debt -0.0129  -0.00940 
 (0.00930)  (0.0148) 
    
Terms of trade 17.65***  17.10*** 
 (4.084) 
 
 (5.772) 
Delayed balance 0.659***  0.596*** 
 (0.101)  (0.140) 
 
Devaluation 
 
3.956** 
  
 (1.762)   
    
EP>0 since MS   -10.85* 
   (6.412) 
    
EP<0 since MS   1.863 
   (14.14) 
    
Constant -2.161*  4.686** 
 (1.252)  (2.278) 
    
R² 0,5974  0,4653 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (1) and (2) are 
Instrumental Variables estimations 
 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we changed the dependent variable by replacing public 
spending, and we find that our primary results are the same. Indeed, it can be seen in the table 
below that spending respond positively to changing economic situations during an expansion, 
which confirms the nature of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. We also observe that this effect is more 
pronounced after the implementation of multilateral supervision (MS). 
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Table 5: Robustness of the cyclicality of fiscal policy and multilateral supervision 
Variables (1)  (2) Dependent variable : Public spending reported to GDP 
 
EP>0 (Expansion) 0.0236*   
 (0.0132)   
    
EP<0 (Recession) 0.0728   
 (0.167)   
    
Aid 0.000275  0.000739 
 (0.000519)  (0.00122) 
 
Delayed debt -3.41e-05  -0.000215 
 (8.25e-05)  (0.000134) 
 
Terms of trade -0.136***  -0.192*** 
 (0.0381)  (0.0550) 
 
Delayed Public spending -0.460***  -0.284** 
 (0.0854)  (0.119) 
    
Devaluation -0.0104   
 (0.0128)   
    
EP>0 since MS   0.147** 
   (0.0578) 
    
EP<0 sinceMS   0.261 
   (0.134) 
 
Constante 0.00612  0.0304* 
 (0.0118)  (0.0178) 
 
R² 0,3  0,3 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (1) and (2) are 
Instrumental Variables estimations 
 
Thus, the CEMAC fiscal policy appears to be pro-cyclical and can greatly affect the stability of 
the States of this zone. This behaviour can also result from weak institutions and a poor 
governance system (Tapsoba et al., 2011). Indeed, it would be more appropriate to use counter-
cyclical fiscal policy given the structure of exports (dominated by raw materials) of CEMAC 
countries. 
However, as mentioned above, several reasons can explain the application of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies, and in addition to the pressure made by certain groups, we can also meet political and 
institutional reasons. According to Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Thornton (2008), most 
countries implementing this kind of fiscal policy, institutional quality are those which have 
deplorable spread of corruption, we find also by Diallo (2008) poorly defined property rights, 
and a near absence of control system and constraints on the executive power. 
Thornton (2008) gives four reasons why fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical: 
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• It allows a smoothing of government spending (down during expansion and an increase in a 
recession, as in the Chilean case mentioned above); 
• It allows a smoothing of production to offset demand shocks or prevent the overheating of the 
economy; 
• There is a prudential measure that allows covering different shocks (permanent or temporary) 
that are sometimes difficult to distinguish; 
• Automatic stabilizers exert a natural counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy and thus allow 
stabilizing the economy. The implementation of counter-cyclical policies will reinforce the 
effect of the automatic stabilizers. 
 
It should nonetheless be noted that the implementation of counter-cyclical policies in CEMAC 
implies that deficits may play a positive impact on economic activity so that the fiscal stimulus 
will be a source of growth in a recession phase, and that the rigors can not only avoid 
overheating expansion, but also smooth production over time. This approach imposes a revision 
of prudential rules established within the framework of multilateral supervision. For example, 
the states could replace de basic fiscal balance by the primary structural balance. 
In addition, States would also benefit to operate a dual diversification: their productive 
structures and their tax base to not just be dependent on oil revenues. This last recommendation 
is based on the fact that the non-oil tax revenues in CEMAC are less than 20% contrary to others 
countries12 which have more than 50%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12Industrialised countries 
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Conclusion 
This paper tented to analyze the cyclicality of fiscal policy in CEMAC zone. It appears that 
fiscal policies in CEMAC countries are strongly pro-cyclical. This procyclicality is accentuated 
by the multilateral supervision. 
Thus, countercyclical fiscal policies appear as an alternative to the countries of the sub-region 
in order to smooth out fluctuations in their cycles. This kind of policy can also decrease the 
probability of asymmetric shocks that seem harmful to monetary policy. 
A review of the convergence criteria is necessary because those used do not reflect the intrinsic 
characteristics of the CEMAC13 countries. However, for future studies it would be interesting 
to determine the optimal deficit in the sub-region that may promote the implementation of 
countercyclical policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13
 Based on example, Tanimoune et al (2005) show that to a debt threshold of 83% of GDP, deficits have expansive 
effects on activity in West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). This rate is estimated at 79% for 
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) according to Bikai (2010). 
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